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Smaller, safer, more powerful batteries with longer service lives and increased 
reliability may have an important impact on logistics requirements. Together, these 
factors will contribute to increasing the Navy’s warfighting capabilities, particularly with 
increasing power demands of emerging weapon systems like high-energy lasers (Valiani, 
2016). Surges in military activity may also lead to large increases in the quantities of 
batteries requisitioned by deploying and deployed forces (Silberglitt et al., 2014). 
Shortages of the BA-5590, the most widely used battery type in DoD, were a major 
concern during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and were attributable in part to industrial base 
limitations (GAO, 2005). Emerging battery technologies have been identified as an area 
where the U.S. must maintain primacy or parity with strategic competitors, while 
continuing to foster world-leading innovation (Brannen et al., 2020). 
Additionally, the proliferation of battery uses may be offset by savings in unit 
procurement costs, as well as a reduction in the variety and quantity of batteries that must 
be maintained at distribution depots, shore installations and onboard vessels. The 
Department of the Navy (DON) is accordingly taking a more strategic approach to its 
long-term battery requirements, including an examination of DON’s relationship with the 
U.S. battery industry (Pasquini, 2019). 
The rapid evolution of battery technology and the globalization of battery 
development and production represent a challenge for DON that is similar to that for 
other technologies that are critical to mission requirements. Batteries represent a 
widespread industrial and consumer commodity produced in large quantities. At the same 
time, the Navy and Marine Corps, like other military organizations, have specialized 
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requirements for energy storage that may or may not correspond with commercial 
products. A middle ground also exists where commercial products might be produced 
with specific modifications to meet DON requirements. Work by the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) Battery Network has demonstrated that doing so reduces unit costs 
compared to production of purely military models (Reece, 2018; Silberglitt et al., 2014). 
This last approach would also have the benefit of limiting the potential faster 
obsolescence associated with many military-specific products (Petersen, 2000), and 
moderating their higher acquisition cost. 
The global battery industry  
There is a major worldwide shift toward adoption of lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries, 
fueled in part by the increasing popularity of electric vehicles. This evolution is 
associated with significant economies of scale in battery development and manufacturing, 
as well as potential difficulties in obtaining raw materials from a variety of global sources 
(Robson & Bonomi, 2020; Moores, 2019). The evolving global context provides a 
challenging environment for the military, which accounts for only a small portion of 
global demand: 
While batteries are crucial for military operations, their development and 
manufacture is primarily driven by the much greater civilian demand, especially 
for hand-held and portable electronic applications such as mobile phones, laptop 
computers, and, most recently, tablet computers (billions per year as opposed to 
millions for military applications). For consumer electronics, rechargeable 
lithium-ion batteries now dominate the market due to their ability to store large 
amounts of energy per unit weight and per unit volume, as compared to all other 
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commercial options. Just as Asia is the source of manufacture of most consumer 
hand-held and portable electronic applications, it is also the center of manufacture 
for the associated batteries and battery components. This applies to both consumer 
and military applications. (Silberglitt et al., 2014) 
In this context, the unknown nature of future developments in battery technology may 
alter the quantities of specific types of raw materials required (Hoogland & Cremers, 
2020). Despite these challenges, global battery cell manufacturing is considered a mature 
industry, with market entry viewed as being difficult, as we will discuss below (Lebedeva 
et al., 2017). The U.S. Department of Energy has provided significant funding for battery 
research in the past decade. While most of the resulting work has focused on electric 
vehicle applications, the resulting infrastructure and human capital could benefit U.S. 
battery manufacturing efforts for other applications (Silberglitt et al., 2014; Department 
of Energy, 2020). 
Battery design and manufacturing, like many other industries, is characterized by 
competition among not just among firms at each stage of the value chain, but between 
value chains themselves. Each value chain is a collection of businesses that develop, 
produce, and use some aspect of a given technology. As the Navy is part of the value 
chain for batteries, how it chooses to articulate its role is important given the rapid 
evolution of technology: 
The literature has shown that positions and relations in the value chain can affect 
innovation. For example, buyer innovation can spur suppliers, users are 
innovation sources for producers, and innovation activities in upstream fields can 
have predictive power on future downstream innovations. (Stephan et al., 2017). 
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Currently, no other single technology is viewed as having the potential to displace the 
dominance of Li-ion, which has demonstrated significant increases in energy density and 
cost reductions (Crabtree et al., 2015; Davis, 2020). While the current generation of Li-
ion technology is reaching maturity, the next generation, which includes solid-state 
batteries, promises significantly higher performance. Also, it should be noted the 
traditional battery industry is viewed as quite conservative, with long development cycles 
and payback periods, as well as slow scale-up for new firms attempting to enter the 
market (Arthur D. Little, 2018).  
Accordingly, there may be a role for government to support the development of 
new and emerging U.S. firms, given the current global dominance of Asian battery 
manufacturers. That dominance is reinforced by what has been termed the “dually 
complex” nature of battery technologies, where both design and manufacturing are 
complex and have significant interdependencies which make technologies difficult to 
replicate (Beuse et al., 2018). In that context, European manufacturers such as Bosch and 
Dyson have made the decision to avoid entering the highly competitive global market for 
the current generation of Li-ion and are proceeding directly to the development of solid-
state technology, which is viewed as having potential high-end applications such as in 
aviation and other military systems (Arthur D. Little, 2018; Mathieu, 2019). 
For government to play a meaningful role in leveraging these developments, its 
personnel will need to further develop their ability to act as well-informed clients. This 
would include a strong knowledge of current and emerging battery characteristics and 
technologies, the state of the global market, and the procurement strategies of key allies 
and partners. Most of all, any adopted approaches must represent a viable means of 
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supporting the Navy’s long-term requirements. Battery acquisition strategies must also 
have a holistic view of the facilities in which batteries are installed and the evolution of 
the systems they are supporting, such as high-energy weapons.  
Actions along these lines would also support attracting innovative firms that 
usually do not participate in Navy contracting activity, even in response to specific 
innovation-related government initiatives (Bresler and Bresler, 2020). As mentioned 
previously, a viable strategy in certain cases could be to favor modification (at a late 
stage of manufacturing) of commercial batteries for military use. Such an approach 
would exploit commercial battery research and development while reducing costs 
compared to a purely military product. A study of soldier-portable batteries (SPBs) 
determined that: 
Commercial production of high-performance cells is presently driven by 
consumer electronic applications, most notably cell phones, smart phones, tablets, 
and portable computers. These are also the applications that drive private-sector 
investment in advanced battery development. To a large degree, what the military 
wants in an SPB overlaps with what consumers want in their batteries: high 
specific energy, storability, long operating life, reliability, and safety. For that 
reason, SPBs acquired by the military have been able to incorporate certain cells 
that also serve civilian applications. This is an important feature of the DoD 
acquisition strategy for SPBs. The demand for cells for SPBs is roughly three 
orders of magnitude smaller than the demand for consumer applications. By 
following a dual-use acquisition strategy, the cells used in SPBs are produced 
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with economies of scale that would be impossible if the cell designs were 
exclusively directed at military applications. (Silberglitt et al., 2014) 
In that vein, NAVSEA launched the Navy Battery Development and Safety 
Enterprise (NBDSE) in 2018 to accelerate the fielding of lithium-ion-enabled capabilities 
to the fleet (Pasquini, 2019). This Navy initiative is supported by research that has found 
that information sharing and an increase in market knowledge about suppliers leads to 
more informed contracting decisions that result in better outcomes (GAO, 2013). Within 
the Navy, these contracting decisions are tightly interrelated with engineering, logistics, 
maintenance, and financial considerations. Accordingly, the success of the NBDSE 
would depend on well-identified leadership and communications functions that would 
support this network’s value creation role within the Navy, including by matching people 
and ideas (Ketonen-Oksi & Valkokari, 2019). 
Challenges of DON acquisition 
A key challenge in DON acquisition is what could be characterized as a mismatch 
between the realities of the product life cycle and contracting regulations. In the early 
stages, i.e. research and development, relationships with battery producers might be 
established through tools such as Other Transactions Authorities (OTAs) and Cooperative 
Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), or participation in the activities of 
the Defense Innovation Unit (Congressional Research Service, 2019; Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA), 2019). Funding is also possible under Title III of the Defense 
Production Act, which is for example being used to procure specialized lithium batteries 
for sonobuoys used in support of anti-submarine warfare (Air Force Research Laboratory, 
2019). Additionally, DON uses programs such as Small Business Innovation Research 
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(SBIRs) and the Office of Naval Research’s Naval Innovation Process Adoption (NIPA) 
to support the development of advanced technologies (Gagnon & Van Remmen, 2018; 
Pasquini, 2019). These approaches promote relatively informal and productive 
communication between the government and manufacturers, building a mutual 
understanding of military needs and industry development and manufacturing 
capabilities. As such, they have the potential to attract non-traditional manufacturers to 
doing business with the government (Fischetti, 2020). DON has achieved some successes 
with battery development and manufacturing using these programs, as well as through 
conventional, “direct” acquisition program funding. Stuart (2017) provided the following 
lessons learned from DON battery initiatives: 
 
• Technology can be developed, transitioned within one program’s available 
funding. 
• Plan transitioning to leverage COTS and other investments suited for each of the 
various tech stages. 
• Select technology with “low enough” risk that a program office is willing to fund 
the transition to production. 
• Favorable cost vs. benefit. 
• Technology must have strong champions (difficult!) 
Arrangements such as OTAs and CRADAs cannot generally be continued into 
larger-scale production as a given technology matures. DOD must then develop more 
neutral specifications and requirements that allow qualified firms to compete for supply 
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contracts. These regulations limit the incentives that producers might have to invest 
capital by working with the government in the earlier phases of the product life cycle. 
However, the Navy’s battery enterprise might benefit from enhanced participation in 
existing OTA initiatives such as the Naval Surface Technology & Innovation 
Consortium, which has focus areas on both advanced and global manufacturing as well as 
a range of battery-related technologies. 
Broader considerations, such the development of a secure source of supply or 
environmental considerations such as recycling or disposal, tend to be negated by the 
requirement to compete for production contracts that are limited by quantities and period 
of performance (Silberglitt et al, 2014). Additionally, contracting imperatives tend to 
limit cooperation and possible cooperative efforts within government agencies that could 
increase standardization, lower unit costs, and improve long-term assurance of supply. A 
recent report on the U.S. industrial base highlighted how the battery industry had 
evolved: 
Characterized by irregular demand proportional to operational tempo, the 
military battery industrial base is diminishing. Military-unique requirements can 
depart from commercial demands in size, quality, safety, power density, weight, 
and environmental ruggedness. Lack of stable production orders has resulted in 
lost capability and capacity, increased surge lead times, workforce erosion, and 
inhibited investments by remaining suppliers. Surge-capacity limiting constraints 
occur at several points along the value chain, from raw material to final battery 
assembly. Additionally, foreign dependencies on essential raw minerals (e.g., 
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lithium or Li) may potentially impact the rechargeable and non-rechargeable 
battery supply chain.  
Most battery configurations are produced by single sources of supply. 
Production of BA-5590 (i.e., preeminent non-rechargeable military battery) is 
currently single-sourced to a foreign-owned supplier in France, with one domestic 
production facility. Decline in demand for military-unique non-rechargeable 
batteries has resulted in capability and capacity loss and the supplier can no 
longer support any significant surge in demands. Even when there were two 
manufacturers, their combined output struggled to meet surge demands for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.  
Asian markets dominate the rechargeable battery industry. Domestic 
rechargeable battery producers cannot compete in production volume and labor 
availability and cost. Most domestic lithium ion cell packagers rely on foreign 
commercial lithium ion cell suppliers from countries such as South Korea, China, 
and Taiwan. Cell availability for military battery packaging is a risk across the 
board for rechargeable batteries as commercial cell manufacturers, often foreign-
owned, are unwilling to divert production from their commercial customers to 
U.S. military battery manufacturers. (Department of Defense, 2018: 82–83). 
Within the constraints described above, a long-term enterprise-wide approach 
might seek to maximize commonality with commercial products and promote long-term 
supportability of weapon systems. The U.S. could also work with its close allies within 
the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB), which are Australia, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom, as well as other allies and partners such as Japan and South Korea, 
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which could reduce the geopolitical risks associated with the supply of raw materials and 
early stages of processing needed in battery manufacturing (Collins & Erickson, 2020; 
Greenwalt, 2019; Olivetti et al., 2017). 
The Navy is focusing its efforts on developing a coordinated long-term, 
cooperative approach with industry that will lead to a reliable supply of batteries that use 
current technology. A useful procurement strategy for batteries will need to be both 
compliant with acquisition regulations and effective in meeting the long-term goals 
associated with an innovation ecosystem. The Navy will need to develop an approach that 
includes incentives that are congruent with industry needs. Competition supports 
innovation, but innovation must also be associated with long-term profitability. DON has 
begun taking steps to increase the extent of multiyear contracting and promote 
competition at the prime and sub-contractor levels, which would also support the 
development of an innovative domestic battery manufacturing industry (GAO, 2013; 
Department of the Navy, 2019). In that context, it should be emphasized that the primary 
driver of battery development and manufacturing is civilian demand (Silberglitt et al., 
2014). 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has suggested that there are four 
general strategic sourcing tactics in procurement: leveraging scale, standardizing 
requirements, prequalifying suppliers, and understanding cost drivers (GAO, 2013). In 
this vein, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has directed federal agencies to 
strengthen their efforts to engage with industry, such as through the practice of “category 
management,” which emphasizes enterprise-wide approaches to procurement that allow 
for better use of agency personnel and acquisition funding. The Office of the Secretary of 
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Defense (OSD) is promoting category management within DoD.1 Part of the motivation 
for category management is that federal agencies engage in little sharing of market and 
supplier intelligence. and make no effort to collect or analyze true spending data at the 
agency level (Laurent, 2019). NAVSEA’s current project to develop a battery database 
supports the development of a category management approach, which has so far had 
limited adoption within the Navy but has been widely adopted in the Air Force (OMB, 
2019a; OMB, 2019b; Pasquini, 2019). A recent research project at the Naval 
Postgraduate School examined the Navy’s spending on studies and analyses, which 
according to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 2.101(b) include “studies in 
support of R&D activities, acquisitions of models, methodologies, and related software 
supporting studies, analyses or evaluations.” The organizations requesting such studies 
include Navy SYSCOMs, with Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren identified with the 
largest expenditure within the Navy over the period 2009–2018 (Brill & Surarujiroj, 2019). 
Toward an innovation ecosystem 
As a customer for battery manufacturers, the Navy is part of what is termed an 
“innovation ecosystem” that also includes other government and industrial customers as 
well as research organizations. Under the innovation ecosystem concept, government, 
industry, and academia each play a boundary-spanning role that fosters technological and 
economic development. A core aspect of innovation ecosystems is each organization’s 
entrepreneurial approach toward supporting innovation (Heaton et al., 2019). 
For example, the pharmaceutical firm Pfizer intentionally issues multiple 
contracts where the market for a given product is less mature, to promote supplier 
 




development. As demand develops and the product matures, Pfizer might bundle its 
contracts to take advantage of increased competition (GAO, 2013). Each organization in 
an innovation ecosystem has the ability to engage in collaborative activities within 
external networks for value creation. The concept of “value” within a given technology is 
shared and evolves with the co-creation of new knowledge through collaborative 
processes within the participant organizations (Ketonen-Oksi & Valkokari, 2019). 
The pursuit of innovation is closely related to an organization’s acquisition 
strategy. Traditional acquisition approaches are generally not successful in the joint 
pursuit of innovation between buyer and supplier (Preeker & De Giovanni, 2018). As 
previously stated, purchasing of critical commodities such as batteries must fully reflect 
considerations such as engineering and maintenance. Also, successful innovation requires 
the participation of concerned stakeholders who understand market conditions and 
industry trends and issues: 
Companies develop category-specific procurement strategies with stakeholder 
buy-in in order to use the most effective sourcing strategies for each category. 
Category-specific procurement strategies describe the most cost-effective 
sourcing vehicles and supplier selection criteria to be used for each category of 
service, depending on factors such as current and projected requirements, volume, 
cyclicality of demand, risk, the services that the market is able to provide, supplier 
base competition trends, the company’s relative buying power, and market price 
trends. For example, Dell’s Global Category Managers oversee teams that 
develop detailed sourcing strategies for each commodity. The major components 
of the sourcing strategies are (1) internal analyses which include spend analysis, 
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stakeholder analysis, business requirements, and cost modeling; and (2) external 
analyses which include market research and supply market analysis. (GAO, 2013) 
Promoting innovation also supports long-term profitability of manufacturers, 
which should lead to security of supply for customers like the Navy. However, the small 
U.S. battery manufacturing industry faces challenges moving from research and 
development to production at scale. There is a lack of investment capital for doing so, 
and the transition to large-volume manufacturing, even for specific industrial and 
commercial uses, generally requires overseas investment: 
Virtually any new technology has a high upfront manufacturing cost until 
demand-driven economies of scale are established. However, these costs can be 
minimized by investments in manufacturing technologies to help develop 
automated processes and offset initial capital investment costs. Another potential 
avenue is for industry to make these investments through the awarding of long-
term production delivery orders. Industry despises uncertainty, and the lack of 
long-term contracts with consistent delivery orders discourages industry from 
making the investments required to remain competitive against foreign sources of 
supply. (Gietter, 2018) 
Government policies do not generally support the establishment of domestic 
manufacturing or the preservation of ownership of intellectual property (IP) by U.S. 
firms. Davis and Ballenger (2017) explain that “while the ingredients and pathways of 
technological progress are well understood, there are few best-practice or standard 
mechanisms to measure and manage technology transition efforts.” Despite this 
challenge, there are a small number of domestically owned and operated manufacturers 
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of battery materials and battery cells (Goldman et al., 2019). The IP challenge may affect 
the development of emerging lithium-ion technologies such as solid-state batteries: 
Managing IP is becoming more important than ever, and not just in protecting 
licenses to operate. Cross-licensing and copatent ownership are on the rise, and 
industry convergence is bringing together companies with very different IP 
maturity and capacity, such as traditional chemical companies, automotive OEMs 
and connectivity players. (Arthur D. Little, 2018) 
A further issue is that while the law authorizes the U.S. government to exercise “march-
in” rights to take over IP for technologies whose development has been publicly-funded 
to prevent that knowledge from being transferred overseas, it has avoided doing so. This 
situation has allowed foreign firms to purchase government-funded IP by acquiring 
domestic startups that have developed promising technologies. The difficult situation of 
U.S. small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is exacerbated by the fact that these 
firms generally face greater barriers to obtaining capital than their counterparts in other 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations (Goldman et 
al., 2019). 
Lack of capital for investing in plant and equipment also contributes to an 
estimated 40 percent gap in productivity between small and large U.S. firms (Ezell, 2020; 
Kota & Mahoney, 2020). DOD’s ability to influence this situation on its own is limited: 
In addition to the challenge posed by China, the accelerating pace of 
innovation, which is increasingly disruptive and transformative to societies, 
makes finding policy responses more difficult. Many advanced 
technologies necessary for national security are developed in the private 
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sector and built via complex supply chains that span the globe, 
making it harder for the U.S. government to use traditional policy 
levers to shape the manufacturing base. Further, the strained relationship 
between the Department of Defense and elements of the private 
sector means that adopting new technologies to strengthen national 
security can be tough. (Manyika & McRaven, 2019: vi–vii) 
In this context, there may be an opportunity to mitigate some of these constraints through 
development of an enhanced partnership with U.S. allies that have firms with battery 
research, development, and manufacturing capabilities (Gulovsen, 2019). These would 
include the NTIB countries; France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea; as well as other 
nations that the U.S. collaborates with on defense-related technologies. Such an initiative 
would be consistent with the desirability of the U.S. taking measures that “bolster and 
scale technology alliances and ecosystems” (Manyika & McRaven, 2019: 69–84). 
 Barriers to entry for new entrants in the Li-ion battery sector have been 
characterized as “almost insurmountable” despite the significant potential of current and 
emerging technologies, including considerable cost and price reductions (Arthur D. 
Little, 2018). As stated above, having the ability to monitor technological evolution, and 
changing performance characteristics becomes crucial for users such as the Navy. In 
doing so, the Navy should also consider a more assertive approach to IP that also 
reinforces the market position of domestic manufacturers. Adopting such a direction may 
be particularly important where technological evolution and changes in the requirements 





Given the rapidly evolving nature of the battery industry, a flexible acquisition 
approach would leverage the knowledge of its professionals while recognizing the nature 
of competition for a specific product. The GAO (2013) has developed an acquisition 
model that is applicable to the Navy’s challenge with battery acquisition. The model 
offers a framework, originally developed for DoD acquisition of services, that is also 
relevant for the government’s relationships with firms that develop or manufacture 
products such as batteries. Rapidly evolving technologies such as batteries require a level 
of sophistication in their acquisition that is analogous to the procurement of services. 
The GAO’s transactional framework model is shown in Figure 1. The model 
covers both short- and long-term approaches. In this context, complexity is defined as the 
relative difficulty of determining performance requirements, with “performance” 
encompassing a broad range of criteria including cost, reliability, and product life. It is 
reasonable to suggest that military-specific requirements add complexity. On the short 
term, the degree of product complexity, as well as the number of relevant suppliers, are 
used to determine procurement tactics that will achieve savings and efficiencies such as 
those desired by the Navy. With respect to the longer term, the focus for non-commodity 
(or more complex) acquisition would be on the development of new suppliers to increase 
competition and promote the health of the industrial base. 
In the broad market for consumer, industrial, and commercial batteries, the 
development and diffusion of technological innovation is accompanied by an increase in 
competition, which also leads to a greater number of suppliers. Accordingly, within the 
transactional framework in Figure 1 shifts from the upper right-hand quadrant to the 
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lower left-hand quadrant. This transition may not be a straightforward one, as adoption of 
an innovation may lead to the resulting product being primarily characterized as being in 
one of the two other quadrants (upper left-hand or lower right-hand). 
The acquisition approach chosen by the Navy would therefore benefit from use of 
contracting authorities that reflect the state of complexity and competition that exists for 
the battery product under consideration. The NBDSE should first develop a 
straightforward project management (PM) process that will provide guidance on how to 
carry out its reviews of markets and technology innovation. This PM framework, in turn, 
will provide a context for consideration of appropriate contracting mechanisms for use by 
SYSCOMs and other organizations involved in the NBDSE. Involvement by Navy 
logisticians is also important so that considerations such as storage, distribution, 
maintenance and other forms of logistics support are integrated into NBDSE activities. 
Some of the most frequently used contracting authorities are shown in Figure 2. 
These include traditional (FAR-based) and non-FAR authorities. One possible way 
forward would be to design an NBSDE acquisition strategy that associates the number of 
suppliers and degree of complexity with corresponding appropriate acquisition 
authorities. In that context, security of supply (industrial policy) and the technological 
maturity would be key determining factors for the choice of an acquisition approach. 
Risk-based cost assessment for contingent supply of batteries 
Silberglitt et al. (2014) laid out four policy choices for addressing the shortfall in 
domestic battery production for defense requirements. The first three may all be good 
ideas in the intermediate-to-long term, though they would require a business case analysis 
for each category of battery: strengthening the supply chain, strengthening the link 
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between battery R&D and manufacturing, and promoting the production of domestic 
rechargeable batteries. However, we will limit our scope to the fourth choice those 
authors outlined, continuing with the status quo. In the immediate and near term, of 
course, this is the only policy option.  
Hence, our task is to review courses of action (COA) available to address the risk 
of a major disruption in supply in the immediate-near term, and make recommendations 
for how business case analyses (BCA) can incorporate risk assessments of the available 
COA. In Figure 1, the GAO (2013) has established four categories of acquisition 
transactions. In modeling a supply disruption, we are essentially examining the impact of 
a sudden shift from the lower two quadrants, to the upper two quadrants: from relatively 
many, to relatively few (or no) suppliers. This creates two kinds of situations, one in 
which contingency plans must be established for commodity-type batteries, and one for 
knowledge-based batteries.  
Accordingly, the central question of this section can be simplified to this: how to 
adjust to a suddenly reduced supplier base, and how are those recommendations modified 
by increased complexity of knowledge-based products. 
Risk necessarily plays a major role in our recommendations, and we need to make 
a distinction between two kinds of risk: stationary, and non-stationary. Stationary, or 
“business as usual” risk, exists in the battery supply chain at all times: demand for 
batteries varies somewhat from day to day, and supplier lead times vary somewhat from 
shipment to shipment. Models addressing this sort of risk are well understood, and will 
not be covered here 
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Rather, we will be developing alternatives for managing a non-stationary risk. In 
this case, the elimination of a major source of supply. Such a risk represents a major shift 
in supply, and patterns of variability in supply, with which business-as-usual safety 
stocks cannot cope. Non-stationary risks are difficult to predict, and may not be handled 
well by simply increasing stockpiles.  
Methods of managing non-stationary risks and providing surety, specifically to 
satisfy the demand for commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products, have been debated, 
and procedures developed for almost a decade. Reddy (2014) noted the inefficiency of 
having buyers conduct myriad individual risk analyses, and called for the development of 
a standard by which sellers could provide measures of assurance of supply chain 
resilience to buyers. To this time, however, no reliable consensus around such a standard 
has been reached. Regardless, the security concerns of military buyers for mission-critical 
equipment are unique enough to require an independent assessment. 
We will review four options: stockpiling, contingency (option) contracting for 
surge capacity, substitution, and shifting stocks. These options are neither exhaustive nor 
exclusive, but their examination will let us discuss the sorts of tradeoffs that need to be 
considered in a BCA if it is to address a non-stationary risk.  
At least three kinds of risk need to be addressed when choosing among these 
options: availability risk, cost/budget risk, and quality risk. Availability risk includes, of 
course, the availability of the raw materials for production of some batteries (e.g., cobalt) 
and not just availability of batteries as products. Especially for knowledge-based 
batteries, several material inputs may not be available in sufficient quantity to support 
ongoing demand (Hoogland & Cremers, 2020; Moores, 2019). One should incorporate 
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any likely shortage in raw material as increasing the probability of a shortage in the 
battery, once supplies of the material are exhausted. 
In general, a shift to fewer suppliers will increase availability risk. Availability 
risk begins when safety stocks are depleted, and this lead-time should be estimated (i.e., 
how much time until contingency plans must begin supplying alternative-sourced 
batteries). For knowledge-based batteries, having fewer vendors also increases quality 
risk. In general, the analysis of alternatives for contingent supply involves an assessment 
the risk of loss of availability and reduced quality, and how those two supply risks create 
cost, budget and mission risk. 
We use the word risk here to mean a formal measure, relating the likelihood 
(probability) of an outcome to the consequence of that outcome (typically done through 
some sort of loss function). Availability risk and cost risk are relatively straightforward to 
measure. Quality (including safety) risk is unique to each type of battery, but we suggest 
the same formal approach – the estimation of the likelihood of an event and its 
consequence. Mission risk is almost impossible to directly determine except through 
approaches such as wargaming.  
We suggest assessing the risk of a given quantity of shortages of a battery in the 
field, as a surrogate for mission risk. Shortages of batteries are a meaningful metric that 
can be tied to mission outcomes by assessing the impact on the weapon or 
communication systems they power. We next outline the four contingent supply 
alternatives illustrated in Figure 3.  
Option 1: Stockpile. A stockpile will only meet a contingent need for a limited 
time because batteries are fundamentally a perishable product. Even in the case of 
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rechargeable batteries, their life is limited, and given the current focus on innovation for 
these products, the lifecycle of a commodity battery may be less than expected. Hence, it 
would be expensive and risky to try to meet all contingent needs via a stockpile. The risk 
of obsolescence, perishability, and even safety puts a ceiling on the amount of inventory 
that can be stockpiled. Estimates of expected life are available from vendors. Safety 
concerns and obsolescence should also be considered when establishing the size of a 
stockpile. For example, if a superior substitute is being developed, the risk of 
obsolescence is increased, and the recommended size of the stockpile should decrease. 
A stockpile must be built from capacity that exceeds current demand, and so, this 
option may not be available for all types of batteries. Estimates of the rate at which a 
stockpile can be built must be obtained, and budgeted. Because batteries are 
fundamentally perishable, the expected life of the stockpile can be extended by rotating 
the inventory and replenishing it, if possible. So long as the stockpile is drawn down at a 
rate below the rate of resupply available, the stockpile can be maintained.  
Two alternatives exist to move inventory through a stockpile. One is to use it as a 
part of the regular replenishment cycle. For slower moving, or shorter-lived batteries, this 
may not eliminate the risk associated with limited shelf life. In which case, with careful 
management, one might sell the batteries on a secondary market once they have reached a 
certain percentage of their useful life, obtaining a kind of salvage value from the battery 
that can be applied to replenishing the stockpile.   
Option 2: Arrange surge capacity. As noted, excess production capacity currently 
exists for some commodity batteries, and might be available for some knowledge-based 
batteries (e.g., as overtime production). Pricing the option to reserve capacity is 
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problematic – if other alternatives are developed, such as stockpiling, the cost of the 
stockpile might be used as an upper bound on what should be paid to reserve excess 
capacity.  
But even if it were determined to be the cheapest among alternatives, that doesn’t 
really address the question as to whether a given price offer for an option to reserve 
capacity would be worth it. To assess the value obtained from such an expense, one needs 
to assess the benefit that could be derived from it, and that benefit is mission-related, not 
easily measured in dollars. Ultimately, the comparison of the cost of a contingency 
contract must be assessed against the mission-related value provided using some multi-
criteria assessment approach. This multi-criterion comparison must be risk-adjusted, so 
that the probability of needing the excess capacity is incorporated into (used to discount) 
the value. We suggest ways to do this, below.  
Option 3: Substitution. It is sometimes possible to change batteries used to supply 
power to a system. This has been done in the past to upgrade systems (Reece, 2018) and 
might be done to reduce supply risk, as well. This would typically be a near or 
intermediate-term option, and not an immediate term option, however. Because 
substitutes must be assessed and the substitution must be validated, or it can create its 
own source of risk, including risks to safety. What we are proposing here is that such 
substitutions might be validated, and even (if necessary) engineered in advance, to 
provide a contingent source of supply. Like surge capacity, the cost of developing such 
options should be assessed against the risk-weighted mission impact of the shortages that 
might occur, should the alternative source of supply not be available.  
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Knowledge-based batteries may have specialized cost drivers (availability or rare 
minerals) and safety considerations that make product substitution decisions more 
difficult. Increased quality risk can be mitigated with increased validation and vendor 
qualification, but that may be expensive and time consuming. Huber (2005) outlines this 
tradeoff for a different knowledge-based product (computing systems) and frames the 
problem as a tradeoff between the cost associated with the quality risk, on the one hand, 
and the cost associated with validation on the other. But here again, the ‘cost associated 
with quality risk’ must be measured in mission terms, not dollars, presenting another 
multi-criteria assessment. 
Option 4: Shift supply. If a threat is localized to e.g., the Pacific theater, it may be 
possible to transfer supply from another theater. Such transshipments simply move risk 
from one theater to another, but that can be an appropriate response if operations are 
restricted to a single theater. Still the amount to be moved – the acceptable level of risk in 
the providing theater – should be assessed in advance, and procedures for such 
transshipments, including pre-authorizations necessary to enact them if they are needed 
on an emergency basis, must be established in advance.  
Finally, since options are not exclusive, they must be assessed incrementally. This 
means they options must be prioritized, and the lower priority options evaluated on the 
benefit they provide in mitigating the residual risk once the higher priority option has 
been put into play. For example, if the contingency plan for a particular battery involves 
first drawing on stockpiles, and then using substitutions, the evaluation of the substitution 





We suggest some practical steps that NBSDE members can take to get the most benefit 
over the longer term from the battery industry. Given that the NPS Naval Research 
Program has now funded continuation of this research, we plan to undertake work in 
support of recommendation 5 (cost model of contingent options) during FY21. 
1. Category management. The practices associated with category management, 
such as market research, spend analysis, and vendor management, are 
gradually being implemented within the Navy as required by OMB direction. 
The NBDSE should incorporate category management practices in its 
activities. A potentially useful first effort could be conducting a spend analysis 
of Navy battery acquisition, in collaboration with DLA. 
2. Involvement by acquisition workforce. The Navy’s acquisition personnel 
(including contracting officers, program managers and logistics staff) should 
participate in the NBDSE on the same basis as other team members. 
Acquisition staff can help develop strategies for working with the battery 
industry and develop innovative acquisition approaches that are well-matched 
to the product types under consideration. 
3. GAO transactional framework. The framework set out in Figure 1 could 
provide a basis for discussions on how the NBDSE might focus its work. The 
Navy’s approach to the battery industry should leverage the degree of 




4. DLA participation. The NBSDE should include representation from DLA, 
given its expertise in working with industry on battery development and its 
role in common-user battery acquisition. 
5. Cost model of contingent options. The NBSDE should sponsor a business 
case analysis that incorporates a cost model for the four options for battery 
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